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The big bank break-up

Douglas Fraser | 20:28 UK time, Friday, 22 January 2010

There is an attraction to removing the risky, casino-style roulette wheels of banking from the utility bits on which we all rely. So says Shadow Chancellor George Osborne, pointing out that he's not following , but has been arguing this since last July.

He's right. There is an attraction to that. But it's not clear that a break-up is the solution to the problem of banks that got into trouble over the past three years. Was it because there was too much risk linked into the mainstream retail banking facilities that no government could be allowed to fail?

In the case of the Royal Bank of Scotland, that may well be so. But was size or too much proprietary trading (risking the bank's own assets) when Northern Rock got into trouble? On the contrary, its problem was a lack of savings to fund its risky lending, and its dependence on wholesale borrowing, at a time when it became much more scarce and expensive.

Halifax Bank of Scotland, now part of Lloyds Banking Group, was taking some risks in its trading. But the giant hole left in its accounts resulted primarily from risky mainstream lending to corporate customers and mortgages for home-owners.

Unexpected tax

And Lehman Brothers? It didn't have a significant retail presence, and specialised in investment banking. But when it collapsed, in September 2008, the shockwaves ran and continue to run through every aspect of the financial system.

So the case has yet to be made for creating walls between necessary retail banking and risky investment. There's risk involved in lending to ordinary customers, including those Americans who were encouraged to buy sub-prime properties.

The core of banking is, or should have been, about managing risk, rather than pretending it can be avoided completely.

The implications of the policies favoured by President Obama, Would-Be Chancellor Osborne as well as the Lib Dems' Vince Cable could start by seeing the Royal Bank of Scotland forced to sell either its Citizens' Bank retail operation or its investment business in the US, before it is forced to split in its UK home market. It could also see changes in ownership of the US banks with significant employment presences in Scotland.

RBS already faces a sizeable unexpected tax bill if the president's proposed Bank Responsibility Levy is introduced. That would be spread over ten years to pay back the support given by the US taxpayer.

And that brings us to a crucial difference between the American and the British position. President Obama is taking a populist stick to the banks, to get payback.

Trade-off

But Britain's payback is very different. Taxpayers have collectively sunk more than £60bn into equity stakes in RBS and Lloyds. That isn't to be paid back in taxes. The plan is to get the banks back into a profitable state, so that share prices rise and those stakes can be sold off at a profit.

Those who wish to break up those banks run the considerable risk of reducing their profitability, thus making it more difficult for the taxpayer to turn a profit on the investment.

So, unlike the American position, there's a likely trade-off in Britain between cutting the banks down to size and maximising the public's financial return.

Comments

  • Comment number 1.

    Douglas Fraser wrote

    "So, unlike the American position, there's a likely trade-off in Britain between cutting the banks down to size and maximising the public's financial return."

    There's one other option you haven't considered.

    Liquidation.

    Wouldn't it be ironic and quite fitting if all of the bank's we bailed out were brought back into the black with healthy balance sheets and share indexes, only for the government to sell it piecemeal back into the market - ensuring every last one of the nescient, avaricious villans who instigated this stinking mess were left without the proverbial pot to piss in.

    If I had my way I'd have let it all come crashing down.

  • Comment number 2.

    I won't say anymore than Gary, have you seriously given any consideration to the effects of letting the banks fail? I have a sneaky feeling the tax payer would be slightly worse off than they are right now!!

  • Comment number 3.

    #2

    I tend not to deal seriously in "what if's" - you could tie yourself up in knots thinking that way.

    The banks that had invested sensibly could afford to buy the stricken one's surely? Isn't that what we mean when we say "survival of the fittest?"

    I would have let the banks who created this mess fail. Many people would have lost thier jobs and no doubt - those who created the mess would have been named, shamed and most probably blacklisted from ever serving within the banking industry again.

    The banks who failed would have no doubt been carved up and sold to the highest bidder. What's wrong with that might I ask? The Clydesdale bank hasn't run itself aground because of it's dodgy investments, neither did Santander.

    Instead - the common man takes a shafting again because of some of the wealthiest and greediest individuals in the world. I wrote it on Peston's blog and it got removed but I'll say it again for the record.

    Each and every banker who takes a bonus from a bank that's been bailed out this year deserves to have a shotgun unloaded into thier greedy, cretinous faces.

    Only apologists, sycophants and people spoiling for a political fight would dare say that men and women as downright avaricious and concieted as these deserve anything less than complete and utter ruin.

    When I see the disgusting level of legalised corruption and financial scandal in the world today, I'm in awe at how little is done to correct it.

    The status quo is our own worst enemy - they more things change, the most they stay the same.

  • Comment number 4.

    This is first time I have heard reference to "sub-prime properties"!!

    It was the creditworthiness of the borrowers that was sub-prime!!!

    (To think, this is where the licence fee goes...)

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