Nuclear theory
- 4 Dec 06, 01:28 PM
Just what were the Cabinet doing at their lunchtime meeting today? In theory they've been discussing whether to renew or replace our nuclear deterrent. I say "in theory" since it's hard to see what the point of the discussion was.
The White Paper outlining the government's proposals is being published two-and-a-half hours after the Cabinet meeting ended. An hour-and-a-half before that, journalists had been invited to read the document at a Ministry of Defence "lock-in" (so-called because you can read the document but not leave the building or use your phone or laptops until after it's published).
Is it just possible that the document had been printed before the Cabinet met? When I asked the Prime Minister's Official Spokesman, he insisted that he would not comment on "process".
This "process" matters, since ministers have made much of taking this vital and costly decision in an open, transparent and democratic way - they point out that the Cabinet have discussed the issue, there is a White Paper and there will be a vote in the Commons.
"So what?" you may ask. If you'd been around the last time a Labour government "updated" our deterrent you might think differently. Harold Wilson's government extended the life of Polaris with the Chevaline programme. Not only did he not have a vote, not only did he not even tell Parliament or the public, he didn't even tell the Cabinet. A handful of ministers took the decision which many members of the Cabinet and most MPs only learnt of when, years later, a Tory Government front bench spokesman revealed it.
Before today, Tony Blair's Cabinet did have discussion on what Number 10 calls "the context" of today's decision and Cabinet ministers have all had the opportunity to meet with the foreign and defence secretaries to discuss the likely contents of the White Paper.
There has been, however, no Cabinet debate about the government's detailed proposals. Why? Number 10 won't say. It's worth noting that the last time a decision was handled in this way was the assessment on whether to scrap the pound and join the Euro. The theory then was that it was easier to handle people's worries in individual meetings rather than around the Cabinet table.
