But will it work in theory?
As the US and UK continue to debate how they might succeed in stabilising Afghanistan, most attention has focused on practicalities such as troop numbers, battling corruption, or improving the local police force.
However, on Sunday the British Army rolled out its new blueprints for how UK forces might work to stabilise a foreign country and what steps the forces should take to do so.
Some see a preoccupation with doctrine or strategy as a profane thing - a game of power point and smooth talking while the ugly reality of war blasts its way across Helmand.
But in truth, the sacrifice of those fighting an insurgency is likely to be in vain unless commanders and politicians know what they are trying to achieve and how they might reach what the soldiers call their "end state".
The bitter fight against the Iraqi insurgency provides simply the most recent and vivid example of what happens when a coalition trying to stabilise a situation proceeds via a series of blunders to make things worse and worse.
The US military however showed an ability to learn from its early mistakes, set out a new doctrine for counter-insurgency (in 2006, co-authored by General David Petraeus and General James Mattis), and implement it, bringing about a dramatic turnaround in security.
For the British the experience was doubly painful, because for quite a time in Iraq, their approach to the Americans was frankly patronising.
But after a while, with militia power growing under the British in Basra, while the Americans began to turn around some of the toughest places in Iraq, the "we wrote the book on counter-insurgency" attitude started to wear a little thin.
So now they have re-written the book, or rather put out two weighty volumes designed to make use of those difficult recent experiences and chart the way ahead in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Major General Paul Newton, who oversaw the writing of the manual Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, had to put forward theories about how to deal with chaos and conflict.
Since most authorities agree, these situations require an ad hoc approach, the very idea of a manual on how to do it is tricky.
"Clausewitz had it about right", said Maj Gen Newton on Monday, referring to one of history's great military theorists, "warfare is the realm of the uncertain".
He also conceded that, "there's no such thing as a pan-Whitehall doctrine" on stabilisation.
Some worry that this is still the problem - the UK government is still not good enough at putting together what the forces do with what other agencies such as the Department for International Development or World Bank do.
The manual reflects then the Ministry of Defence's view about how this tricky business of stabilisation is best done.
As to the specifics, , but if I tell you that the manual's definition of "stabilisation" alone runs to 54 words, you'll understand that it's no simple matter.
It is about bringing about a more orderly society without actually nation building.
The other publication - Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency - is full of the more practical stuff about running military operations in places like Iraq or Afghanistan.
It is not on the MoD website yet, but .
For those who seek it out, it actually provides essential context to why the forces fight the way they do in places like Helmand.
These two publications then represent a shedding of some past confusion or complacency about how the British military should attempt to leave ungoverned space a little more orderly by the time it departs.
How well these ideas will work, we will see in the unforgiving atmosphere of Afghanistan during the coming years.
I'm Mark Urban, and I'm Newsnight's diplomatic and defence editor. I deal with war and peace around the world, so with apologies to Leo Tolstoy, that's what this blog will be called. No literary pretensions, just an attempt to drill down to the key issues - people around the world struggling for peace and security.
Comment number 1.
At 16th Nov 2009, jauntycyclist wrote:the first line says
...The rules-based international system relies upon stability...
there are many ways to achieve 'stability' without democracy? Or human rights? Or freedom? etc?
do they not have a model of uk society? how is stability achieved in the uk? By limiting democracy and land ownership and in effect bribing certain classes with public money. If farmers/landowners were not paid 4 billion a year would they not be growing opium? If police and the courts and other key public servants were not paid well and regularly would they not be taking bribes to pay their mortgages?
they cannot institute anything abroad because they do not have a model for the uk. A template for a just society. The taliban have a model for what they see as a just society. The maoists have a model for their just society. but we have no model and this thrashing about in the dark doesn't really provide one. So they are intellectually defeated before they even start.
so really this is the manual that admits of stupidity
if someone was going to jump off a tall building do they need a 'manual' or someone to tell them its not a good idea?
liberal interventionism is not a good idea. it is a vanity project of those who think they talk to god?
so we don't need a manual of how to jump off tall buildings but just to not jump in the first place?
bring the troops home.
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Comment number 2.
At 16th Nov 2009, jauntycyclist wrote:Field Manual Volume
why did kuwait work and agfghanistan not? did the population have to be 'secured' [and all the rest of the mumbo jumbo]?
how come kuwait was rebuilt in a few years whereas afghanistan is going backwards?
why not contrast and compare? then will we see why the afghanistan population will never 'be secured'.
actually in analogy the manual can be read as a political party manual of how to secure power?
e.g
The Narrative: Mobilising the Population. The narrative is central to the
..... effort. The narrative must be a carefully crafted message which
aims to strengthen the legitimacy and build the authority of the indigenous
government in the eyes of the population. It has to resonate with the local
population, use their words and imagery in a way that taps into deep cultural
undercurrents. The narrative aims to convince the people that the indigenous
government, supported by international forces and organisations, can deliver a better future in terms of security, justice and material wealth. Commanders must strive tooperate within the context of the campaign narrative.
and
Shaping Perceptions. It should be assumed that every decision made,
action taken, and message published or broadcast shapes the opinion of the
indigenous population,....
remind anyone of domestic politics?
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Comment number 3.
At 16th Nov 2009, barriesingleton wrote:THE DARK ART OF STABILISATION
British folk are becoming steadily more unstable. I have often shown how Westminster (across parties) 'draws its own' from the population at large; it draws the most driven and needy, yielding unstable governance. The heat of Westminster fomentation, distils from this awful mess, refined oddities called ministers, who vie to run the world - having little or no aptitude. As they MANIFESTLY make a greater and greater mess of stability at home, The Great Brown 'Super-Distillate', lectures on fixing Afghanistan's stability. The very fact that he would attempt to do this, de facto, should bar him from any office that can endanger life.
Having just apologised for arrogance and ignorance, wielded a few decades ago, he applies the same disastrous British Attributes ALL OVER AGAIN. Of course, the kids being hurt, and the anguished mothers, are THEM not US, so apology will be slow in coming. Vile Britannia - Britannia violate; leave each land you've violated - DESOLATE.
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Comment number 4.
At 17th Nov 2009, Mark Cronin wrote:The main problem is that this is going to be a neverending issue. Terrorism will be around forever. There is no quick fix for this. Is handing over control of their own country back to them the best idea? Maybe not. But we can't control it forever.
Im more for sorting out this problem, but isn't it just a bit of a losing fight?
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Comment number 5.
At 17th Nov 2009, barriesingleton wrote:WAR COMMERCE BANKING SCHOOLING INDIVIDUALISM EQUALITY (#4)
With you there Mark. My title, attempts to list the TOOLS OF CIVILISATION to which of elevated ciphers are wedded. Our MPs do not have much philosophy or psychology between them, yet the 'Terror' circus can only be approached in those terms.
While Britain and America stay on the Bush-Blair path of 'preemptive attack' anywhere in the world (as long as they can't hit back, in kind)
(In case anyone wants to misread my use of 'EQUALITY' - men and women are designed MASSIVELY UNequal. At school they never stop telling you that apples and pears are different - though both are fruit and sometimes it is hard to choose . . .)
it is indeed a 'losing fight' and a lost cause.
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Comment number 6.
At 24th Nov 2009, clusterbombunit wrote:whatever new doctrine is proposed it's doomed to failure, unless enough resources are provided to carry it out, the strategy we undertook in Southern Iraq was the wrong one, but it was forced on the Army as it would and in fact could not deploy the numbers of forces needed to hold the TAOR.
US was successful in Northern Iraq , not so much by General Patraeus brilliance, but luck with the Sunni Tribes turning against ALQuada and the fact that the US could send several Manoeuvre Brigades during the "Surge".
We have forgotten that The Malayian Emergency required tens of thousands of Commomwealth troops deployed each year.
Likewise at it's height twenty two thousand British troops , plus thousands of UDR and RUC , where required to contain PIRA in Ulster.
Even the so called small operations Dhofar and the Indonesian Confrontion, tied up thousands of soldiers, if only handfuls saw active service.
Coin takes a long time and is very labour intensive, the present size of our ground forces make any large- scale effort impossible.
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