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Having followed the twists and turns of the US/Iraqi attempt to negotiate legal agreements governing the future presence of American troops in that country, I have been using any time I have left after reporting the Mumbai crisis to go through with a fine toothcomb .

First things first - it is quite an achievement that two countries locked in such a difficult relationship should have managed to achieve this treaty, something that even as recently as September senior officials did not think would be possible, prior to the expiry of the United Nations mandate for Coalition Forces on 31st December this year.

In the end two separate agreements, one on the future status of US forces, the other dealing with the strategic relationship between the two countries, have been rolled into one. It sets a timetable for the withdrawal of American forces "from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities" no later than 30th June 2009. Its statement that "all of the United States Forces shall withdraw from Iraqi territory no later than 31st December 2011" seems straightforward enough.

However, when one reads Article 27 of the agreement, headed "Deterrence of Security Threats", it is apparent that the two governments have kept open the possibility to respond to any threat to the security of Iraq by "diplomatic, economic or military measures, or any other measure, to deter such a threat". This is precisely the kind of open invitation for future security cooperation that many in Iran tried to thwart through their allies in Baghdad.

Article 27 furthermore also sets out, "cooperation in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi security forces"; a task that experts predict might require the presence of many thousands of US 'advisors'.

All the same, the new agreement is not entirely the stuff of Iranian nightmares, because, among other things, it forbids the use of Iraq for attacks on neighbouring countries. Similarly, American military concerns have been accommodated to some extent, in severely limiting Iraqi legal jurisdiction over US military personnel.

In a key concession however, there is no suggestion that the US withdrawal should be 'conditions based', although it does suggest that it might happen faster than the 2011 deadline. This marks a cave-in on the part of the Bush Administration, US military commanders, and even some elements within the Iraqi coalition government - all of whom wanted to avoid rigid timetables. It is also very convenient for the since it sets a firm date for withdrawal, lets him accelerate that if he wants, but still allows Washington to reverse that process if, under Article 27, the two governments jointly agree on some future threat.

The agreement is then a key milestone that looks likely to reduce drastically the US profile in Iraq within months, and to eliminate that presence altogether within three years. It says this has been made possible by the, "dramatic and positive developments in the country" - a reference to the marked decline in violence in the past year.

In a sense though, the fact that the two sides have worked through their political differences, dealt with what are for many Iraqis such sensitive issues, and have done it all before the expiry of the UN mandate is perhaps the best testimony to date of political progress in Iraq.