

House of Commons
International Development
Committee

**PREPARING FOR THE
HUMANITARIAN
CONSEQUENCES OF
POSSIBLE MILITARY
ACTION AGAINST IRAQ**

Fourth Report of Session 2002–03

Volume I

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International Development
Committee

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HUMANITARIAN
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Fourth Report of Session 2002–03

*Volume I:
Report and Proceedings of the Committee*

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Chemical, biological.	.

FOURTH REPORT

The International Development Committee has agreed to the following Report:

PREPARING FOR THE HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ

SUMMARY

This report examines the likely humanitarian consequences of military action against Iraq and the adequacy of the preparations for dealing with them. The wide range of scenarios as to how a conflict might develop greatly complicates the task of planners. Nevertheless, we consider that insufficient emphasis has been placed on the humanitarian implications of military action. The UK Government and the UN have been reluctant to plan openly for fear that this would be seen as condoning military action or accepting it as inevitable. The US Government, through USAID, has developed a plan in isolation from other agencies. The resulting lack of information-sharing and coordinated planning could lead to either duplication or gaps in the relief effort. A lack of funds which are immediately available could affect all the key humanitarian players. The potentially massive scale of the relief effort—leaving aside the costs of post-war reconstruction—could exceed the capacity of the international system.

Sixty percent of the Iraqi population depends on rations provided by the UN Oil-for-Food Programme (OFF). We do not believe that the OFF programme will be able to continue in the event of war. It is likely to cost 16.9

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Introduction

1. The United Nations Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions on Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.¹ In 1991 the UN Security Council, concerned about the worsening humanitarian situation inside Iraq, adopted Resolution 986 which established the ‘oil-for-food’ (OFF) programme, designed to allow Iraq to sell oil to finance the purchase of humanitarian supplies. The programme was implemented in 1996 when a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the United Nations and the Government of Iraq.² Oil-for-Food has been a lifeline for Iraq to such an extent that today, more than 60% of the population is dependent of food rations provided under the OFF programme.

2. Concerns have been raised about the appa

¹ The Committee reported on the impact of sanctions on Iraq in its Second Report of Session 1999–2000, “The Future of Sanctions”(HC67)

² Oil-for food programme—A fact-sheet, *UN Office of the Iraq Programme*, January 2003

³ The Committee reported on the impact of sanctions on Iraq in its Second Report of Session 1999–2000, “The Future of Sanctions”(HC67)

Riddell, Director, International Department, Christian Aid, Mr Mike Aaronson, Director General, Save the Children UK and Dr Al-Sharistani, Iraqi Refugee Aid Council. We also held a private meeting with Mr Ross Mountain, Assistant Emergency Relief Co-ordinator and Director of the United Nations' Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ms Anupama Rao Singh, Deputy Director Field Support and Inter-Agency Collaboration Section, Programme Division, UNICEF, and Mr Nicholas Oberlin, Programme Adviser for Iraq, World Food Programme. We would like to thank all those who contributed written and oral evidence to the inquiry as such short notice. We would also like to express our gratitude to our specialist adviser, Mr Larry Hollingworth, but stress, as always, that the views contained in the report are those of the Committee alone.

The problems of planning—a multiplicity of scenarios

6. The main obstacle to planning for the humanitarian consequences of war in Iraq is the range of the possible scenarios. These stretch from quick and effective air strikes resulting in Iraqi surrender and the welcome into Baghdad of coalition troops as liberators, to a long drawn out ground war with the possibility of use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Planners do not know what it is they are planning for and may be planning for the best rather than the worst-case scenario. Clare Short told us: "The danger is that there is not full preparation for the risks. There is preparation for what is the hopeful scenario but that is not good enoughCwhat happens if something goes wrong and we need more effort?"⁴ Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOse l w [(vie)4485t gttc.sin Id

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⁴ Q6

⁵ Ev 45, Q37

⁶ Ev 34

⁷ Ev 17

⁸ USAID contingency plans for humanitarian assistance to Iraq, *USAID Fact Sheet*, 24 February 2003

⁹ *Ibid.*

humanitarian operations. **We recommend that DFID immediately issues a statement outlining its basic humanitarian contingency plans. This would be a useful source of information for humanitarian actors and would also provide reassurance that adequate importance has been attached**

¹⁰ ICVA, InterAction and SCHR

¹¹ Ev 33, Ev 37 [HelpAge International], Ev 45

¹² Q53

¹³ Ev 38

¹⁴ Ev 17

¹⁵ Q5

¹⁶ HC Deb, 26 February 2003, col 244

¹⁷ Ev 14, Q45

¹⁸ Q33

¹⁹ Ev 32

²⁰ Q37

²¹ Ev 45

²² USAID contingency plans for humanitarian assistance to Iraq, *USAID Fact Sheet*

The likely consequences and how they might be managed

Food distribution and the oil-for-food programme

13. Since 1991 most Iraqis have had to depend on food aid for their survival. Food aid comes in the form of rations financed by the oil-for-food programme (OFF) which generates funds from oil revenues to be spent on humanitarian needs. Limits were set on the amount of oil that Iraq could sell but the ceiling was removed by the Security Council in 1999. Receipts from the sale of oil are paid into a UN bank account and the spending monitored closely. Supply and delivery of humanitarian supplies is contracted out commercially. At the end of the delivery chain are small locally-run ration shops. Aside from government-contracted and local delivery mechanisms a number of UN agencies are involved, particularly in those areas of northern Iraq which comprise the Kurdish-controlled governorates. The OFF programme costs \$250 million per month for the food component alone. OFF is vital to the survival of Iraqi civilians. The head of DFID's Middle East and

³³ Q10

³⁴ *Report of Forum to discuss humanitarian contingency plans should there be a war with Iraq*, chaired by Caroline Spelman MP, 26 November 2002

³⁵ Ev 12

³⁶ Ev 21, Ev 37

³⁷ Ev 36

³⁸ Ev 12, Ev 16

³⁹ Ev 21

⁴⁰ Ev 34

⁴¹ Ev 12, Ev 15

⁴² Ev 16

⁴³ Q29

⁴⁴ Q55

⁴⁵ Q8

⁴⁶ Ev 32

⁴⁷ USAID contingency plans for humanitarian assistance to Iraq, *USAID Fact Sheet*, 24 February 2003

⁴⁸ Q55

⁴⁹ US has secret plans to ensure food distribution to Iraq: USAID Chief,

contracts would be hindered as a result of conflict. At present it is the Government of Iraq which pays, outside of OFF, for internal transport, and the salaries of civil servants engaged in humanitarian distribution tasks as well as those working in infrastructure support.

18. NGO witnesses were pessimistic about the prospect of the OFF programme continuing in the event of military action. They foresaw problems not only at the upper echelons of the

⁶⁰ Q33

⁶¹ Q15

⁶² *Report of forum to discuss humanitarian contingency plans should there be a war with Iraq*, chaired by Caroline Spelman MP, 26 November 2002

⁶³ Ev 13

⁶⁴ Unofficial UN Report, *Likely humanitarian scenarios*, *Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*, 10 December 2002

⁶⁵ *Avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq*, *Refugees International*

the Iraqi side of their borders. Turkey is also planning and preparing camps along its border.⁷¹ There are also fears in the northern governorates that Turkish troops will enter northern Iraq and remain indefinitely, in order to forestall any move to establish a separate Kurdish state.⁷² Syria is the only country that has expressed willingness to take refugees, though refugees may have difficulty reaching Syria, Saudi Arabia or Jordan because of the desert terrain.⁷³ Some refugees may also head for Kuwait, particularly if there are rumours that there will be sufficient food and relief materials for them at the Kuwaiti borders.⁷⁴

Internally displaced persons

23. Iraq already has between 700,000 and 900,000 IDPs.⁷⁵ There are likely to be around 900,000 newly displaced persons in the event of a conflict.⁷⁶ UNHCR estimates that there will be approximately an equal population movement between the northern and southern regions.⁷⁷ Christian Aid's Roger Riddell told us that the local authorities were preparing for a possible influx of a million IDPs in the north and were discussing with UNHCR the setting up of ten camps for a population of about four million.⁷⁸ Although sites for camps of IDPs are being identified, a group of NGOs operating in northern Iraq voiced concerns about the lack of water and sanitation facilities at these sites, and the lack of co-operation between the UN and NGOs operating in the area.⁷⁹ Health services will be needed in refugee/IDP camps as the risk of disease, trauma and injury (including injuries following use of chemical weapons) is high. Healthcare services could provide vaccinations against smallpox and other diseases which could potentially be used in a biological attack. **Planning for sites for IDP and refugee camps must include planning for the provision of water, sanitation, and health care. Food and non-food items such as tents should be pre-positioned at camp sites. Camp planning must also take careful consideration of the risk of injury from unexploded ordnance and landmines.**⁸⁰ IDPs may be located in inaccessible rural areas and therefore be difficult to assist. As Clare Short highlighted, there may also be a lack of water or shelter in areas such as these: "There is a very serious issue of potential refugee movements in desert type areas with not enough water that have been thought about, and I am not sure anyone has got solutions in place. That could be very serious".⁸¹ The question of who will be responsible for internally displaced persons in the event of a conflict remains—the UN has not designated, other than the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), a lead agency to be responsible for IDPs, appearing to leave the responsibility to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to take the lead.⁸² As IDPs can be classified as civilian victims of a conflict, providing them with assistance does fall within ICRC's remit. UNHCR will take responsibility for assistance to displaced persons who make it to camps within Iraq, in addition to its traditional tasks of caring for refugees who have crossed an international border.

⁷¹ Avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, *Refugees International*, 5 February 2003

⁷² Kurds: We will resist Turkish Troops in Iraq, *ABS-CBN News*, 1 March 2003

⁷³ Q3

⁷⁴ Q35

⁷⁵ Ev 43

⁷⁶ Avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, *Refugees International*, 5 February 2003

⁷⁷ Unofficial UN Report, Likely humanitarian scenarios, *Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*, 10 December 2002

⁷⁸ Q34

⁷⁹ Ev 36

⁸⁰ Ev 16, 23, 36

⁸¹ Q9

⁸² Q19, HC Deb, 26 February 2003, col 245

engaging with those issues”.⁹³ Such negotiations will be difficult as military and humanitarian objectives will in some instances be irreconcilable. **Military planning should seek to minimise humanitarian consequences. However, it is inevitable that there will be damage to Iraq’s infrastructure. It is therefore essential that sufficient medical supplies are available to deal with any outbreak in disease. Vaccination programmes should be carried out now to minimise casualties. Provision must also be made to address the potential lack of clean drinking water and sanitation services.**

Internal conflict

26. Iraq is an ethnically and religiously diverse country. The overall majority of Iraq’s population (55%) are Shia’s Arabs, but historically they have been marginalised by the dominant Sunni Arabs who ma

⁹³ Q13

⁹⁴ Ev 41

⁹⁵ Ev 42

⁹⁶ Ev 41

⁹⁷ Ev 21

⁹⁸ Ev 42

⁹⁹ Kurds: We will resist Turkish Troops in Iraq, *ABS-CBN News*, 1 March 2003

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Ev 22

¹⁰² Ev 36, Ev 42

may be a greater threat to security than ethnic conflict, or may aggravate ethnic tension.¹⁰³ The most pressing concern is that military action would lead to a breakdown of central authority as different groups try to establish themselves or take control over areas of the country. Clare Short told us:

It would be a nightmare if different groups started breaking [Iraq] up and the national borders in the surrounding area might be changed, that would lead to chaos and very,

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¹⁰³ Ev 34, Ev39

¹⁰⁴ Q20

¹⁰⁵ HC Deb, 26 February 2003, col 244

¹⁰⁶ Ev 1, 13, 40, 46, Qq 1,4,15,20,27,33,34,35

¹⁰⁷ Ev 13

¹⁰⁸ *Op. cit.*, Report of Forum to discuss humanitarian contingency plans should there be a war with Iraq,

¹⁰⁹ Ev 40, Q33

¹¹⁰ Ev 23, 38. Ann Clwyd MP, a Member of the Committee, also reported this concern following a visit to northern Iraq in February 2003

¹¹¹ Q53

clothing and equipment are prohibitively expensive, putting them beyond the reach of most agencies. Every effort must be made to ensure that information on the supply of protective clothing is provided. Giving information on weapons capability is an extremely difficult area for the military but it is one where there needs to be serious cooperation between the military and UN agencies and NGOs.

Who will deliver humanitarian relief?

The Role of the UN—during and after a conflict

30. Even without a further UN Security Council Resolution authorising military action, the UN will still be able to operate in Iraq under its humanitarian mandate. Clare Short thought that a lack of UN authorisation for military action would not prevent a humanitarian relief effort and that UN agencies would “still take it as their duty to engage if they could reasonably engage”.¹¹² The UN stated that they have a mandate to operate, that there was a need to be involved and that they did not need a UN Security Council Resolution for every crisis as they worked to their mandate. It is possible that the UN position as a deliverer of humanitarian assistance might even be made easier if there were no UN authority for war because it would allow the UN to carry out humanitarian duties without being seen as a party to the conflict. The importance of UN involvement was stressed by NGO witnesses: “certainly in the south of Iraq the number of international and local NGOs available would not meet the humanitarian need without the punch that the United Nations has operationally”.¹¹³

31. The involvement of the UN post-conflict is a more complicated issue. Clare Short told the House of Commons on 26 February that her “greatest worry is that there is not yet a”

¹¹² Q3

¹¹³ Q38

¹¹⁴ HC Deb, 26 February 2003, col 242

¹¹⁵ Q38

¹¹⁶ Q18

32. Clare Short and NGOs all argued the need for a further Security Council Resolution which should explicitly provide for the provision of humanitarian relief.¹¹⁷ Clare Short told us:

there is a genuine commitment in our Government to think through and try to have the humanitarian considerations fully taken on board, and my own view is if there is to be a second Resolution it is massively desirable for the world, and indeed for the people of Iraq, that there is united and considered UN-authorized action, if there is to be action, and that any such authorisation would have to take account of the needs of the people.¹¹⁸

A second Security Council Resolution has been proposed but it is designed mainly to reinforce Resolution 1441. The draft makes no provision for humanitarian relief. We believe that the Resolution should take account of the likely humanitarian consequences of military action. Subsequent to any armed conflict, a further Resolution will be needed to make provision for changes to the OFF programme to allow for its continuation during and after a conflict. It should also set down what the UN's role will be after a conflict. In Afghanistan we saw the importance of the role played, in the early days, by the UN Special Representative in balancing different interests and championing and safeguarding the rights of civilians before, during and after military action. Iraq will also benefit from a Special UN Representative. We believe that an appointment should be made immediately.

¹¹⁷ Qq 3, 7, 18, 46

¹¹⁸ Q7

¹¹⁹ HC Deb, 26 February 2003, col 244

¹²⁰ Ev 18

¹²¹ Iraq: ICRC statement at Humanitarian Meeting, 15–16 Feb 2003, *International Committee of the Red Cross*, 18 February 2003

¹²² HC Deb, 26 Feb 2003, col 245

¹²³ Ev 35

¹²⁴ Qq 1, 38, 45

¹²⁵ Ev 14, Qq 40, 49, Position Paper on Humanitarian—Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance,

¹⁴² USAID contingency plans for humanitarian assistance to Iraq,

another.¹⁵¹ Whilst we are satisfied that resources will not be diverted away from existing crises, we remain concerned about the media's inability to give coverage to more than one humanitarian crises at a time. DFID have told us that use of funds from its contingency reserve for Iraq would not affect its overall aid budget but: "could reduce DFID's capacity to respond to other emergencies which have not yet occurred or supplement existing funding to ongoing emergencies".¹⁵² **We are concerned that the international system lacks the financial and resource ability to cope with multiple crises around the world and echo the statement made by CARE International that: "We are, as the Secretary of State's written evidence pointed out, very, very worried about the loss of publicity of very serious humanitarian disasters which are in place at the moment in Southern Africa,**

¹⁵¹ Ev 3

¹⁵² Ev 31

¹⁵³ Q55

¹⁵⁴ Iraq: war, law and humanitarian protection, Report of meeting of the *Overseas Development Institute* debate on 22 January 2003

¹⁵⁵ Q16

¹⁵⁶ Q35

¹⁵⁷ Q36

¹⁵⁸ *Op. cit.* ODI debate on 22 January 2003

but have not been ratified by the USA or Iraq. Those elements of IHL that are most relevant seek to enforce a distinction between civilians and combatants, and to direct hostilities only against combatants. Under IHL, forces are prohibited from making indiscriminate attacks, must distinguish between military targets and civilians and are obliged to take all precautions to ensure that targets are military, refraining from launching attacks that would have a disproportionate effect on civilians.¹⁵⁹ CARE International emphasised in its written evidence that: “international humanitarian law requires the warring parties to attend to the needs of civilians”.¹⁶⁰ In the event of a post-war military occupation, the occupying force will have the primary responsibility for ensuring sufficient access to food and water for Iraq’s civilians and this will undoubtedly play a part in defining the overall shape of any humanitarian response.¹⁶¹ NGOs are concerned that governments are not adequately prepared to fulfil their responsibilities in this area but recent statements from USAID indicate that they are preparing to deliver on their responsibilities.¹⁶² **Although Clare Short told us that humanitarian considerations must be paramount, there are still concerns that this will not be the case.**¹⁶³ Christian Aid’s Roger Riddell said: “I am worried about a line of questioning which suggests we do the war and then worry about the humanitarian consequences afterwards. The Geneva Conventions require that those who engage in military activity focus on civilians right from the start”.¹⁶⁴ Clare Short told the House that the: “simplistic view that we should get on with the war, after which my Department and a few people can clean up, is ill-informed. I and my Department have been fully engaged in trying to get the world to face the humanitarian risks and make preparations”.¹⁶⁵ The Prime Minister told the House that there needs to be: “a humanitarian plan that is every bit as viable and well worked out as a military plan”.¹⁶⁶ We fully concur, but have yet to be convinced that this is the case.

Conclusions

42. It is essential that the same emphasis should be placed on the humanitarian implications of war against Iraq as on the military planning. It would appear that the military have gone ahead with their planning on the assumption that someone else will come along to clear up afterwards. We do not believe it is acceptable to wait until the war is over before turning to face the humanitarian consequences. Military planning must seek to minimise the damage to civilian infrastructure. Health, sanitation, irrigation and vital food distribution networks will suffer if Iraq’s already dilapidated infrastructure is destroyed. Despite USAID’s claims that food distribution will continue through oil-for-food, statements of intent are insufficient without acceptance of the financial and legal implications. The lack of funding that is immediately available has affected the ability of the UN to prepare. The international system may not have the capacity to cover the costs of delivering food up to 15 million people and reconstructing Iraq’s infrastructure.

43. The role of the UN in coordination is central to the humanitarian effort. The current lack of coordinated leadership in dealing with the humanitarian issues, and poor information-sharing, has hampered effective planning and preparation. Military action against Iraq will have major humanitarian consequences and may involve the use of chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons. There is a risk of ethnic conflict and state fragmentation in the immediate post-war period. We are concerned about how these issues would be managed in the absence of immediate post-war UN leadership. We recognise that

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, Protecting Iraq’s civilians, *Oxfam briefing paper* February 2003

¹⁶⁰ Ev 14

¹⁶¹ *Op. cit.* ODI debate.

¹⁶² USAID contingency plans for humanitarian assistance to Iraq, *USAID Fact Sheet*, 24 February 2003

¹⁶³ Qq 25, 38, 51

¹⁶⁴ Q51

¹⁶⁵ HC Deb, 26 February 2003, col 244

¹⁶⁶ HC Deb 3 February 2003, col 36

some NGOs may perceive their neutral humanitarian position as being compromised if they operated under a military occupation. The military may inevitably have to play the primary role in providing humanitarian assistance during the conflict and will undoubtedly be present after it ends. A lead role planned for the UN in the immediate aftermath of hostilities may protect humanitarian space and facilitate cooperation between the military and humanitarian agencies without compromising the latter's impartial position.

LIST OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (a) **We recommend that DFID immediately issues a statement outlining its basic humanitarian contingency plans. This would be a useful source of information for humanitarian actors and would also provide reassurance that adequate importance has been attached to the humanitarian consequences of military action (paragraph 8).**
- (b) **Notwithstanding the difference of opinion between UN and NGOs, and understanding the need for confidentiality, we urge DFID and the UN, where possible, as a principle to provide confidential briefings to NGOs to facilitate effective planning (paragraph 10).**
- (c) **There is a pressing need for a mechanism for coordinating the UK humanitarian response so that UK NGOs can be connected with the UN, the military and local NGOs to facilitate information sharing between all relevant actors. (paragraph 11).**
- (d) **It is clear is that the scale of funds needed will be massive, given the dependency of the majority of the Iraqi population on the OFF programme**

any outbreak in disease. Vaccination programmes should be carried out now to minimise casualties. Provision must also be made to address the potential lack of clean drinking water and sanitation services (paragraph 25).

- (k) In preparing to prevent the outbreak of ethnic conflict in Iraq the UK Government should remember the experience of Afghanistan where an initial “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” approach led the US to support regional power holders, thereby fuelling warlords and creating barriers to security and stability. The best case scenario for military action would involve Iraqi surrender with central authority structures remaining intact. However, it is essential that in planning for the possible humanitarian consequences of military action the worst case scenario, involving ethnic conflict, is considered. Safe havens could be a useful mechanism for preventing ethnic conflict but it essential that there is clear identification of who will be safe inside havens and how they will be protected. (paragraph 28).
- (l) Ideally, international and Iraqi health workers would be trained in how to deal with the human impact of chemical or biological weapons and would receive the same immunisations against biological weapons that are offered to military personnel. The UN has discarded the option of providing protective suits for its staff because they will be impractical. In any case UN staff would be withdrawn at the outset of any chemical or biological attack. Specialist clothing and equipment are prohibitively expensive, putting them beyond the reach of most agencies. Every effort must be made to ensure that information on the supply of protective clothing is provided. Giving information on weapons capability is an extremely difficult area for the military but it is one where there needs to be serious cooperation between the military and UN agencies and NGOs (paragraph 29).
- (m) Even without a further UN Security Council Resolution authorising military action, the UN will still be able to operate in Iraq under its humanitarian mandate (paragraph 30).
- (n) It is important that the UN should have the lead role in a post-conflict Iraq as soon as possible. There is a real danger that donors and NGOs would not play a

I a q I a q e l

of UN peace keeping forces, or monitors. We endorse this proposal. (paragraph 35).

- (q) Military/humanitarian cooperation is an extremely difficult area. But the difficulties have to be resolved now before any fighting begins (paragraph 36).**
- (r) This underlines the case for having a lead role for the UN planned for the aftermath of hostilities. (paragraph 36).**
- (s) Based on the evidence we heard, the scale of the humanitarian need may well exceed the capacity of the international system. (paragraph 37).**
- (t) Despite pledges being made to a UN emergency fund at a conference in Geneva on 15–16 February, the indication is that the scale of humanitarian need will drastically outweigh the funds available and that there is a severe lack of funds available immediately for planning and preparation. (paragraph 38).**
- (u) We are concerned that the international system lacks the financial and resource ability to cope with multiple crises around the world and echo the statement made by CARE International that: "We are, as the Secretary of State's written evidence pointed out, very, very worried about the loss of publicity of very serious humanitarian disasters which are in place at the moment in Southern Africa, in East Africa and we now have West Africa with**

LIST OF WITNESSES

Wednesday 12 February 2003

Rt. Hon. Clare Short, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for International Development, Mr Alistair Fernie, Head of Middle East and North Africa Department, and Mr Peter Troy, Head of Humanitarian Programmes Team, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, Department for International Development Ev 4

Mr Raja Jarrah, Programme Director, CARE International, Mr Roger Riddell, Director, International Department, Christian Aid, Mr Mike Aaronson, Director General, Save the Children UK (SC UK) and Dr Al-Shahristani, Iraqi Refugee Aid Council Ev 24

LIST OF MEMORANDA INCLUDED IN THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

1. Department for International Development Ev 1 and 31
2. CARE International Ev 12
3. Christian Aid Ev 14
4. Save the Children UK Ev 20

LIST OF APPENDICES TO THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

1. CPAU, The Archbishops' Council of the Church of England Ev 33
2. A Forum of International NGOs working in Northern Iraq

LIST OF UNPRINTED MEMORANDA AND PAPERS

Copies of the following memoranda and papers have been placed in the House of Commons Library, where they may be inspected by Members. Other copies are in the Record Office, House of Lords, and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be addressed to the Record Office, House of Lords, London SW1A 0PW (tel: 020 7219 3074). The Record Office is open to the public from 9.30 am to 5.00 pm on Mondays to Fridays.

1. Report of Forum to discuss humanitarian contingency plans should there be war with Iraq, 26th November 2002
2. Letter to the Committee from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, MAG
3. Oil-for-Food Programme: A Factsheet, February 2003
4. Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from Barbara Stocking CBE, Director, Oxfam
5. Oxfam Briefing Paper, Number 40: Protecting Iraq's civilians
6. Refugees International Report, 'Avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq'